<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><channel><title>Groundy — Security</title><description>Where AI infrastructure inherits the unpatched assumptions of the web stack beneath it, and trust boundaries collapse faster than disclosure timelines can keep up.</description><link>https://groundy.com/</link><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://groundy.com/category/security/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AMD Took 124 Days to Patch the RCE It First Called Out of Scope</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/amd-took-124-days-to-patch-the-rce-it-first-called-out-of-scope/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/amd-took-124-days-to-patch-the-rce-it-first-called-out-of-scope/</guid><description>AMD closed a plaintext-HTTP RCE in its auto-updater as out of scope, then shipped a 124-day fix adding HTTPS but only a CRC32 checksum where a code signature belongs.</description><pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2026 23:59:40 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-14T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>vulnerability-disclosure</category><category>amd</category><category>patch-management</category><category>rce</category><category>bug-bounty</category><category>update-security</category><category>threat-modeling</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>OpenAI Frames Instruction Hierarchy as an Open Challenge, Not a Prompt-Injection Fix</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/openai-frames-instruction-hierarchy-as-an-open-challenge-not-a-prompt-injection/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/openai-frames-instruction-hierarchy-as-an-open-challenge-not-a-prompt-injection/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s IH-Challenge frames instruction hierarchy as an open benchmark, not a shipped defense, shifting prompt-injection protection to orchestration-layer filtering.</description><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 03:20:40 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-13T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>instruction-hierarchy</category><category>agent-security</category><category>ai-safety</category><category>orchestration</category><category>openai</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Skill Injection: Hiding Undetectable Instructions in What an AI Agent Loads</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/skill-injection-hiding-undetectable-instructions-in-what-an-ai-agent-loads/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/skill-injection-hiding-undetectable-instructions-in-what-an-ai-agent-loads/</guid><description>POISE achieves 89.3% attack success on codex+gpt-5.2 by placing malicious instructions where agents naturally execute them, making static content scanners effectively blind.</description><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 23:04:30 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>skill-injection</category><category>llm-agents</category><category>prompt-injection</category><category>ai-security</category><category>agent-frameworks</category><category>content-scanning</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Splitting a Malicious Task Across Tool Calls Slips Past LLM Agent Guardrails</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/splitting-a-malicious-task-across-tool-calls-slips-past-llm-agent-guardrails/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/splitting-a-malicious-task-across-tool-calls-slips-past-llm-agent-guardrails/</guid><description>Splitting a disallowed action into benign tool calls bypasses per-call safety filters in LLM agents, lifting jailbreak success by 28 percentage points over current baselines.</description><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 07:52:02 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-security</category><category>agent-safety</category><category>tool-calling</category><category>guardrails</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>provenance-tracking</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Web Agents Can Be Talked Into Abandoning Their Task: The TRAP Benchmark</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/web-agents-can-be-talked-into-abandoning-their-task-the-trap-benchmark/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/web-agents-can-be-talked-into-abandoning-their-task-the-trap-benchmark/</guid><description>The TRAP benchmark finds 13 to 43 percent of web agent tasks can be redirected by persuasive page content, exposing a blind spot in current instruction-hierarchy defenses.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:00:15 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-08T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>agent-safety</category><category>web-agents</category><category>prompt-injection</category><category>persuasion-attacks</category><category>benchmark</category><category>security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Shallow Neural Nets Beat LLM Guardrails at Catching Prompt Injection</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/shallow-neural-nets-beat-llm-guardrails-at-catching-prompt-injection/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/shallow-neural-nets-beat-llm-guardrails-at-catching-prompt-injection/</guid><description>GuardNet&apos;s 47M-parameter BiLSTM ensemble detects prompt injections in 50 ms on CPU, but 0.747 blind-benchmark AUROC and classifier-evasion risks leave the arms race.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:32:19 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-08T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>llm-security</category><category>guardrails</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>lightweight-classifiers</category><category>bilstm</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>When an AI Agent Clicks a Link: OpenAI&apos;s Data-Exfiltration Model</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/when-an-ai-agent-clicks-a-link-openais-data-exfiltration-model/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/when-an-ai-agent-clicks-a-link-openais-data-exfiltration-model/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s URL provenance filter concedes content inspection is intractable. Agents that mix sensitive data with web access face a structural exfiltration risk.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 08:01:51 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-08T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>data-exfiltration</category><category>prompt-injection</category><category>ai-agents</category><category>url-filtering</category><category>openai</category><category>agent-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Benchmarking RAG Over Cyber Threat Intelligence: Where Retrieval Breaks</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/benchmarking-rag-over-cyber-threat-intelligence-where-retrieval-breaks/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/benchmarking-rag-over-cyber-threat-intelligence-where-retrieval-breaks/</guid><description>CTIConnect, a KDD 2026 benchmark of 1,860 QA pairs across five CTI feeds, shows retrieval quality, not model size, determines copilot accuracy across ten LLMs.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 09:19:51 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-07T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>rag</category><category>cyber-threat-intelligence</category><category>retrieval-quality</category><category>soc-copilot</category><category>knowledge-graphs</category><category>llm-benchmarks</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Stronger Safety Alignment Made LLMs Easier to Jailbreak, Not Harder</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/stronger-safety-alignment-made-llms-easier-to-jailbreak-not-harder/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/stronger-safety-alignment-made-llms-easier-to-jailbreak-not-harder/</guid><description>A single-query attack turns safety-trained LLMs&apos; own refusal reasoning against them. Across 30 models, better safety judgment correlated with higher exploit rates, not lower.</description><pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 15:52:52 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-10T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-safety</category><category>jailbreak</category><category>safety-alignment</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>rlhf</category><category>ai-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>SAML Signature Bypass Is Back: Inside the SAMLStorm Vulnerability Class</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/saml-signature-bypass-is-back-inside-the-samlstorm-vulnerability-class/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/saml-signature-bypass-is-back-inside-the-samlstorm-vulnerability-class/</guid><description>XML Signature Wrapping attacks on SAML keep recurring because the gap between validation and processing is structural. Edge WAF rules are a delaying tactic, not a fix.</description><pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 15:37:34 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-06T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>saml</category><category>xml-signature-wrapping</category><category>sso</category><category>web-application-firewall</category><category>identity-security</category><category>canonicalization</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>SAMLStorm: The SAML Signature Bug That Forges Valid SSO Logins</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/samlstorm-the-saml-signature-bug-that-forges-valid-sso-logins/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/samlstorm-the-saml-signature-bug-that-forges-valid-sso-logins/</guid><description>SAML signature-confusion attacks exploit gaps between XML canonicalization and parsing, letting attackers mutate signed assertions to forge authenticated SSO sessions.</description><pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 08:53:00 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-06T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>saml</category><category>sso</category><category>signature-confusion</category><category>xml-canonicalization</category><category>identity-security</category><category>vercel</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Vercel&apos;s Flags SDK Exposed Feature-Flag Definitions via CVE-2025-46332</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/vercels-flags-sdk-exposed-feature-flag-definitions-via-cve-2025-46332/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/vercels-flags-sdk-exposed-feature-flag-definitions-via-cve-2025-46332/</guid><description>CVE-2025-46332 exposed flag names, rollout conditions, and security kill switches via Vercel&apos;s discovery endpoint, making operational metadata into reconnaissance material.</description><pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 01:49:42 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-06T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>cve-2025-46332</category><category>feature-flags</category><category>vercel</category><category>information-disclosure</category><category>security-vulnerability</category><category>reconnaissance</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Jailbreak Suffixes Hit Harder at Specific Token Positions, New GCG Variant Shows</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/jailbreak-suffixes-hit-harder-at-specific-token-positions-new-gcg-variant-shows/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/jailbreak-suffixes-hit-harder-at-specific-token-positions-new-gcg-variant-shows/</guid><description>SlotGCG shows adversarial token position, not just content, determines jailbreak success, with 14% higher attack rates and 42% higher rates against defended models.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 11:14:33 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-05T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>jailbreak</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>gcg</category><category>llm-security</category><category>perplexity-filtering</category><category>slotgcg</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>OpenAI Adds Lockdown Mode to ChatGPT, Shifting Prompt-Injection Risk to Users</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/openai-adds-lockdown-mode-to-chatgpt-shifting-prompt-injection-risk-to-users/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/openai-adds-lockdown-mode-to-chatgpt-shifting-prompt-injection-risk-to-users/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s Lockdown Mode disables agentic features builders rely on rather than fixing prompt injection at runtime, forcing a binary choice between security and capability.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 10:45:48 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-05T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>chatgpt</category><category>openai</category><category>security</category><category>agentic-workflows</category><category>lockdown-mode</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Activation Steering Was Sold as LLM Control. New Work Makes It an Attack Surface</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/activation-steering-was-sold-as-llm-control-new-work-makes-it-an-attack-surface/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/activation-steering-was-sold-as-llm-control-new-work-makes-it-an-attack-surface/</guid><description>Poisoning 4-6% of tokens in a steering dataset silently inverts refusal vectors into jailbreaks, achieving 20-55% ASR. Shared vector bundles are the attack surface.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 08:43:48 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-05T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>activation-steering</category><category>jailbreak</category><category>supply-chain-security</category><category>llm-safety</category><category>data-poisoning</category><category>representation-engineering</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Catching LLM Agents Leaking Credentials From Their Own Activations</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/catching-llm-agents-leaking-credentials-from-their-own-activations/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/catching-llm-agents-leaking-credentials-from-their-own-activations/</guid><description>A new arXiv study shows credential leaks by LLM agents are detectable inside model activations before output tokens are generated, moving DLP upstream from text filtering.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 05:26:57 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-05T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>credential-exfiltration</category><category>llm-agents</category><category>activation-probing</category><category>agent-security</category><category>data-loss-prevention</category><category>multi-turn-attacks</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>The 2026 npm Attacks Proved AI Coding Assistants Are a Supply-Chain Target</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/the-2026-npm-attacks-proved-ai-coding-assistants-are-a-supply-chain-target/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/the-2026-npm-attacks-proved-ai-coding-assistants-are-a-supply-chain-target/</guid><description>The 2026 npm supply-chain wave explicitly targeted AI coding assistants as privileged identities. Lockfiles and ignore-scripts stopped what SLSA provenance and OIDC could not.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:08:43 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-05T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>npm-supply-chain</category><category>ai-coding-assistants</category><category>open-source-security</category><category>package-management</category><category>devsecops</category><category>malware</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>ChatGPT&apos;s New Lockdown Mode Borrows Apple&apos;s Name for a Prompt-Injection Kill Switch</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/chatgpts-new-lockdown-mode-borrows-apples-name-for-a-prompt-injection-kill/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/chatgpts-new-lockdown-mode-borrows-apples-name-for-a-prompt-injection-kill/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s ChatGPT Lockdown Mode disables web browsing, images, and Deep Research, conceding that model-level defenses against prompt injection have plateaued as of early 2026.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 23:49:43 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-04T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>chatgpt-security</category><category>lockdown-mode</category><category>openai</category><category>network-exfiltration</category><category>enterprise-ai</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Students Are Prompt-Injecting AI Graders to Score Full Marks</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/students-are-prompt-injecting-ai-graders-to-score-full-marks/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/students-are-prompt-injecting-ai-graders-to-score-full-marks/</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv study finds that prompt injection in student submissions manipulates LLM grading systems into awarding full marks, and current defenses do not hold.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:36:10 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-04T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>llm-grading</category><category>ai-education</category><category>academic-integrity</category><category>adversarial-input</category><category>llm-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Removing an LLM Backdoor Post-Training Without the Poisoned Data</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/removing-an-llm-backdoor-post-training-without-the-poisoned-data/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/removing-an-llm-backdoor-post-training-without-the-poisoned-data/</guid><description>Patcher removes LLM backdoor triggers from a single observed failure and model weights, no poisoned training data required. Deployers gain an alternative to full retraining.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:34:38 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-04T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-backdoor</category><category>model-security</category><category>backdoor-removal</category><category>supply-chain</category><category>open-weight-models</category><category>adversarial-ml</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Stored Prompt Injection Now Persists Across AI Agent Sessions</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/stored-prompt-injection-now-persists-across-ai-agent-sessions/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/stored-prompt-injection-now-persists-across-ai-agent-sessions/</guid><description>Prompt injection planted in one agent session resurfaces in later ones through persistent memory and tool state, bypassing input sanitization that only validates external.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 08:55:56 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-04T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>agent-security</category><category>llm-security</category><category>ai-agents</category><category>cross-session-attacks</category><category>owasp</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>LLM Data Poisoning Survives the Data-Cleaning Defenses Built to Stop It</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/llm-data-poisoning-survives-the-data-cleaning-defenses-built-to-stop/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/llm-data-poisoning-survives-the-data-cleaning-defenses-built-to-stop/</guid><description>The Phantom Transfer attack plants password-triggered backdoors into LLMs and survives all 11 tested data-level defenses, including full paraphrasing of every training sample.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 05:40:09 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-04T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>data-poisoning</category><category>llm-security</category><category>backdoor-attacks</category><category>model-training</category><category>weight-inspection</category><category>training-data</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Why OpenAI Bets on Instruction Hierarchy to Stop Prompt Injection</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/why-openai-bets-on-instruction-hierarchy-to-stop-prompt-injection/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/why-openai-bets-on-instruction-hierarchy-to-stop-prompt-injection/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s instruction hierarchy improves TensorTrust scores to 0.94, not 1.0. The gap is probabilistic, not a protocol guarantee, and the burden falls on app builders.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 23:17:15 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>instruction-hierarchy</category><category>llm-security</category><category>openai</category><category>agent-safety</category><category>defense-in-depth</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Stopping Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks Without Retraining the Model</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/stopping-multi-turn-llm-jailbreaks-without-retraining-the-model/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/stopping-multi-turn-llm-jailbreaks-without-retraining-the-model/</guid><description>THRD is a training-free defense against multi-turn LLM jailbreaks that runs entirely at inference time, cutting attack success to 0.2-4.0% without modifying model weights.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 21:20:20 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-safety</category><category>jailbreak-defense</category><category>inference-time</category><category>multi-turn-attacks</category><category>ai-security</category><category>adversarial-robustness</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>African Languages Are a Jailbreak Blind Spot for English-Tuned LLM Safety</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/african-languages-are-a-jailbreak-blind-spot-for-english-tuned-llm-safety/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/african-languages-are-a-jailbreak-blind-spot-for-english-tuned-llm-safety/</guid><description>TukaBench extends JailbreakBench to seven African languages and finds English safety alignment fails to transfer. Culturally adapted prompts widen the gap for deployers.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 20:37:20 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-safety</category><category>multilingual-ai</category><category>jailbreak</category><category>red-teaming</category><category>african-languages</category><category>ai-alignment</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Poisoning Open-Source LLM Merges: One Bad Checkpoint Hijacks the Result</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/poisoning-open-source-llm-merges-one-bad-checkpoint-hijacks-the-result/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/poisoning-open-source-llm-merges-one-bad-checkpoint-hijacks-the-result/</guid><description>RogueMerge shows a single poisoned task vector survives six merge algorithms across 170+ LLMs, breaking the assumption that merging dilutes adversarial influence.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:02:00 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-merging</category><category>model-security</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>supply-chain</category><category>open-source-llms</category><category>backdoor-attacks</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>An Autonomous Research Agent Now Discovers SOTA LLM Jailbreak Attacks</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/an-autonomous-research-agent-now-discovers-sota-llm-jailbreak-attacks/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/an-autonomous-research-agent-now-discovers-sota-llm-jailbreak-attacks/</guid><description>Claudini&apos;s autonomous loop designs jailbreak algorithms hitting 80% ASR on GPT-OSS-Safeguard and 100% on Meta-SecAlign-70B. Attack discovery now costs a compute run.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 14:02:38 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-jailbreak</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>ai-safety</category><category>automated-red-teaming</category><category>llm-security</category><category>autonomous-agents</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Malware Can Prompt-Inject the AI Agent Reverse-Engineering It</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/malware-can-prompt-inject-the-ai-agent-reverse-engineering/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/malware-can-prompt-inject-the-ai-agent-reverse-engineering/</guid><description>Decompiled malware strings can prompt-inject LLM agents used for triage. Defenses fail over 85% of the time, and formal analysis argues the problem is structurally unsolvable.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 11:06:09 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>malware-analysis</category><category>llm-agents</category><category>reverse-engineering</category><category>adversarial-ml</category><category>cyber-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>CVE-Factory Turns Published CVEs Into Security Agent Training Data. A 32B Model Beats Claude 4.5 Sonnet.</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/cve-factory-turns-published-cves-into-security-agent-training-data-a-32b-model/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/cve-factory-turns-published-cves-into-security-agent-training-data-a-32b-model/</guid><description>CVE-Factory reproduces known CVEs at 66% verified accuracy. A 32B model trained on its traces beats Claude 4.5 Sonnet, commoditizing offensive security expertise.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 09:54:40 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-10T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>vulnerability-reproduction</category><category>security-agents</category><category>cve-benchmarks</category><category>model-fine-tuning</category><category>open-source-security</category><category>offensive-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>LLM Reasoning Traces Leak the Private Data They&apos;re Told to Hide</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/llm-reasoning-traces-leak-the-private-data-theyre-told-to-hide/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/llm-reasoning-traces-leak-the-private-data-theyre-told-to-hide/</guid><description>Reasoning models embed sensitive data in chain-of-thought traces omitted from final answers, creating a privacy gap that output-level safety training cannot address.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 17:17:56 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>chain-of-thought</category><category>privacy</category><category>prompt-injection</category><category>llm-safety</category><category>reasoning-models</category><category>data-leakage</category><category>model-deployment</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Video Jailbreaks Hit Multimodal LLMs by Splitting Payloads Across Clips</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/video-jailbreaks-hit-multimodal-llms-by-splitting-payloads-across-clips/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/video-jailbreaks-hit-multimodal-llms-by-splitting-payloads-across-clips/</guid><description>Splitting harmful requests across benign video clips defeats per-frame moderation on eight multimodal LLMs, forcing safety teams to invest in cross-clip semantic reasoning.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:57:18 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>video-jailbreak</category><category>multimodal-safety</category><category>content-moderation</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>mllm</category><category>video-modality</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Vercel AI SDK CVE-2025-48985: Input Validation Bypass Hits LLM App Builders</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/vercel-ai-sdk-cve-2025-48985-input-validation-bypass-hits-llm-app-builders/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/vercel-ai-sdk-cve-2025-48985-input-validation-bypass-hits-llm-app-builders/</guid><description>An index mismatch in Vercel AI SDK lets attackers inject arbitrary bytes into prompt file inputs. With no NVD CVSS score yet, most dependency scanners will not flag it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 19:15:55 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>cve</category><category>ai-sdk</category><category>input-validation</category><category>supply-chain</category><category>llm-security</category><category>dependency-management</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Hijacking AI Agent Memory: One Conversation Can Plant a Persistent Trojan</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/hijacking-ai-agent-memory-one-conversation-can-plant-a-persistent-trojan/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/hijacking-ai-agent-memory-one-conversation-can-plant-a-persistent-trojan/</guid><description>MemPoison plants a persistent trojan in AI agent memory through ordinary conversation, defeating extraction and rewriting pipelines with up to 95% attack success.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:54:38 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>agent-memory</category><category>memory-poisoning</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>llm-security</category><category>embedding-attacks</category><category>persistent-memory</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Why Attack Success Rate Misleads LLM Jailbreak Benchmarks</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/why-attack-success-rate-misleads-llm-jailbreak-benchmarks/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/why-attack-success-rate-misleads-llm-jailbreak-benchmarks/</guid><description>The ASR metric behind every jailbreak leaderboard collapses distinct safety failures into one number, so models with the same score can fail in completely different ways.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:07:36 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>llm-safety</category><category>jailbreak-benchmarks</category><category>attack-success-rate</category><category>temporal-logit-observability</category><category>llm-evaluation</category><category>red-teaming</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Job Seekers Are Prompt-Injecting AI Resume Screeners. New Study Measures the Hit Rate</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/job-seekers-are-prompt-injecting-ai-resume-screeners-new-study-measures-the-hit/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/job-seekers-are-prompt-injecting-ai-resume-screeners-new-study-measures-the-hit/</guid><description>A USENIX Security 2026 study of 200K real resumes found 1% contain hidden prompt injections, with 90% stuffing invisible keywords rather than manipulating LLM instructions.</description><pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 15:48:34 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>resume-screening</category><category>llm-security</category><category>hiring-tech</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>ats-vendors</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Why Audio Jailbreaks Slip Past the Safety Training Built for Text LLMs</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/why-audio-jailbreaks-slip-past-the-safety-training-built-for-text-llms/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/why-audio-jailbreaks-slip-past-the-safety-training-built-for-text-llms/</guid><description>A taxonomy of audio jailbreak attacks reveals four surfaces text-trained guardrails never cover, forcing voice-interface vendors to red-team each modality separately.</description><pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 14:25:30 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>audio-jailbreaks</category><category>llm-safety</category><category>multimodal-alignment</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>voice-interfaces</category><category>model-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>LoRA Adapter Backdoors Generalize Beyond Their Trigger Tokens</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/lora-adapter-backdoors-generalize-beyond-their-trigger-tokens/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/lora-adapter-backdoors-generalize-beyond-their-trigger-tokens/</guid><description>A LoRA adapter backdoor generalizes across token neighborhoods beyond the trained trigger, making behavioral probing mandatory for teams consuming community fine-tunes.</description><pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 12:07:26 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-02T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>lora-adapters</category><category>backdoor-detection</category><category>supply-chain-security</category><category>llm-fine-tuning</category><category>token-generalization</category><category>behavioral-probing</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Three Labs Concede Browser Agents Cannot Stop Prompt Injection</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/three-labs-concede-browser-agents-cannot-stop-prompt-injection/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/three-labs-concede-browser-agents-cannot-stop-prompt-injection/</guid><description>OpenAI, Anthropic, and DeepMind concede prompt injection in browsing agents is architectural, not patchable, with attacks succeeding over 80% of the time in recent tests.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 19:11:42 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-29T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>ai-agents</category><category>browser-security</category><category>adversarial-attacks</category><category>ai-safety</category><category>llm-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Vercel Firewall Now Blocks SAMLStorm. Can an Edge WAF Fix a SAML Signature Flaw?</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/vercel-firewall-now-blocks-samlstorm-can-an-edge-waf-fix-a-saml-signature-flaw/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/vercel-firewall-now-blocks-samlstorm-can-an-edge-waf-fix-a-saml-signature-flaw/</guid><description>Vercel&apos;s firewall blocks SAMLStorm payloads at the edge, but HTTP-layer rules cannot validate SAML signature canonicalization. The dashboard badge is a tripwire, not a fix.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 16:33:43 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-29T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>saml</category><category>vercel-firewall</category><category>waf</category><category>xml-crypto</category><category>signature-wrapping</category><category>samlstorm</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Vercel Could Block React2Shell at the Edge. Its Next 13 CVEs Had No Shortcut.</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/vercel-could-block-react2shell-at-the-edge-its-next-13-cves-had-no-shortcut/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/vercel-could-block-react2shell-at-the-edge-its-next-13-cves-had-no-shortcut/</guid><description>Vercel shielded hosted React apps from React2Shell at the platform layer. Its May 2026 batch of 13 advisories, none fixable by WAF, proves that edge was the exception.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 20:07:51 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-28T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>react-server-components</category><category>react2shell</category><category>vercel</category><category>security-vulnerability</category><category>self-hosting</category><category>rce</category><category>cve</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>OpenAI Adds a GPT-5 System Card Addendum on Sensitive Conversations</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/openai-adds-a-gpt-5-system-card-addendum-on-sensitive-conversations/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/openai-adds-a-gpt-5-system-card-addendum-on-sensitive-conversations/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s GPT-5 addendum adds mental health evals and reports large safety gains between builds, but a buried extremism regression and scattered docs complicate compliance.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 18:07:24 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-10T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>gpt-5</category><category>system-cards</category><category>ai-safety</category><category>compliance</category><category>mental-health</category><category>openai</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>MCP Tool Description Poisoning: New Benchmark Shows Agents Trust Manuals That Lie</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/mcp-tool-description-poisoning-new-benchmark-shows-agents-trust-manuals-that-lie/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/mcp-tool-description-poisoning-new-benchmark-shows-agents-trust-manuals-that-lie/</guid><description>A new MCP benchmark shows GPT-4o susceptible to nearly 100% of attacks where a tool&apos;s description lies about its purpose, a gap runtimes and scanners cannot detect.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 17:17:57 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-28T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>mcp</category><category>tool-description-poisoning</category><category>agent-security</category><category>llm-benchmark</category><category>prompt-injection</category><category>gpt-4o</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>OpenAI&apos;s New Safety Bug Bounty Pays Researchers for Jailbreaks and Policy Bypasses</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/openais-new-safety-bug-bounty-pays-researchers-for-jailbreaks-and-policy/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/openais-new-safety-bug-bounty-pays-researchers-for-jailbreaks-and-policy/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s safety bounties create a vendor-controlled disclosure market where NDAs silence participants, payouts trail serious red-team costs, and open publication has no lane.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 14:42:22 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-28T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>bug-bounty</category><category>jailbreak</category><category>prompt-injection</category><category>ai-safety</category><category>openai</category><category>red-teaming</category><category>responsible-disclosure</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Axios npm Compromise Forces Vercel Into Platform-Level Remediation</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/axios-npm-compromise-forces-vercel-into-platform-level-remediation/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/axios-npm-compromise-forces-vercel-into-platform-level-remediation/</guid><description>When compromised axios npm versions carried a North Korean RAT, Vercel blocked C2 egress at the deploy layer because the npm registry did not verify OIDC provenance.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 13:04:28 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-27T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>npm-supply-chain</category><category>axios</category><category>vercel</category><category>sapphire-sleet</category><category>oidc-provenance</category><category>package-security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Next.js Dev Server CVE-2025-48068: Any Web Page Could Read Your Source Files</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/next-js-dev-server-cve-2025-48068-any-web-page-could-read-your-source-files/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/next-js-dev-server-cve-2025-48068-any-web-page-could-read-your-source-files/</guid><description>CVE-2025-48068 lets any webpage read source files from a running Next.js dev server via cross-origin script inclusion, exposing secrets loaded in .env files.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 11:26:45 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-27T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>nextjs</category><category>cve</category><category>cross-origin</category><category>dev-server</category><category>frontend-security</category><category>localhost</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Apple Names Claude in CVE Credit Line, Setting Vendor Attribution Precedent</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/apple-names-claude-in-cve-credit-line-setting-vendor-attribution-precedent/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/apple-names-claude-in-cve-credit-line-setting-vendor-attribution-precedent/</guid><description>Apple named Claude in a macOS Tahoe 26.5 CVE credit, the first major vendor to credit an LLM in a security advisory, forcing a decision on AI attribution across the industry.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 13:10:04 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-06-10T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>cve-attribution</category><category>ai-security-research</category><category>apple-security</category><category>bug-bounty</category><category>vulnerability-disclosure</category><category>claude</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>CISA&apos;s Internal Data Leak Tests the Disclosure Standards It Sets for Others</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/cisas-internal-data-leak-tests-the-disclosure-standards-it-sets-for-others/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/cisas-internal-data-leak-tests-the-disclosure-standards-it-sets-for-others/</guid><description>CISA exposed cloud credentials on GitHub for months while preparing to mandate 72-hour breach reporting under CIRCIA, undermining its enforcement credibility.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 15:48:54 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-26T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>cisa</category><category>circia</category><category>breach-disclosure</category><category>credential-leak</category><category>cybersecurity-policy</category><category>incident-response</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>TanStack npm Attack: When OIDC Trusted Publishing Becomes the Attack Vector</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/tanstack-npm-attack-when-oidc-trusted-publishing-becomes-the-attack-vector/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/tanstack-npm-attack-when-oidc-trusted-publishing-becomes-the-attack-vector/</guid><description>The TanStack npm attack published 84 malicious packages without a leaked token, exploiting OIDC trusted publishing so the CI workflow itself became the credential.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 15:04:39 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-26T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>supply-chain</category><category>oidc</category><category>npm</category><category>github-actions</category><category>trusted-publishing</category><category>security</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>Nx s1ngularity Attackers Used Local Claude Code and Gemini CLI to Steal Developer Tokens</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/nx-s1ngularity-attackers-used-local-claude-code-and-gemini-cli-to-steal/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/nx-s1ngularity-attackers-used-local-claude-code-and-gemini-cli-to-steal/</guid><description>The s1ngularity attack used AI coding agents on developer machines to steal credentials from over 1,000 accounts, exposing a gap that npm scanning alone cannot close.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 12:57:03 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-26T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>supply-chain-security</category><category>ai-coding-agents</category><category>npm-security</category><category>credential-harvesting</category><category>developer-tools</category><category>s1ngularity-attack</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item><item><title>OpenAI Ships Lockdown Mode and Elevated Risk Labels for ChatGPT Sessions</title><link>https://groundy.com/articles/openai-ships-lockdown-mode-and-elevated-risk-labels-for-chatgpt-sessions/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://groundy.com/articles/openai-ships-lockdown-mode-and-elevated-risk-labels-for-chatgpt-sessions/</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s Lockdown Mode kills ChatGPT network exfiltration paths at the infrastructure layer, conceding that model-level filtering cannot stop prompt injection.</description><pubDate>Sun, 24 May 2026 16:51:51 GMT</pubDate><dc:creator>Groundy Editorial</dc:creator><atom:updated>2026-05-24T00:00:00.000Z</atom:updated><category>prompt-injection</category><category>chatgpt-security</category><category>lockdown-mode</category><category>ai-safety</category><category>data-exfiltration</category><category>enterprise-ai</category><author>Groundy Editorial</author></item></channel></rss>